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NO-DROP POLICIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES: GUARANTEE TO ACTION OR
DANGEROUS SOLUTION?
ANGELA CORSILLES
INTRODUCTION

During the past fifteen years, the nation has witnessed a veritable
explosion in the number of laws enacted to combat the problem of
woman battering.' In the field of criminal law, in particular, warrantless misdemeanor arrest statutes, 2 antistalking legislation, 3 and specialized domestic abuse laws 4 have provided criminal justice personnel

1. See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction to Domestic Violence:
The Changing Criminal Justice Response vii, x (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa
eds., 1992) (referring to "wholesale changes in state statutes dealing with domestic
violence"); Kathleen J. Ferraro & Lucille Pope, IrreconcilableDifferences, in Legal
Responses to Wife Assault 96, 98 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (discussing "tremendous
shifts, reforms, and expansions in domestic violence laws during the last 15 years").
This Note defines "woman battering" as that pattern of violent and coercive acts perpetrated by a person against a current or former partner, the calculated purpose of
which is to control the thoughts, beliefs, or conduct of the partner or to punish the
partner for resisting the perpetrator's control. Cf Martha R.Mahoney, Legal Images
of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L Rev. 1, 33 & n.131
(1991) (citing Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An Examination, in Naming the Violence: Speaking Out About Lesbian Battering 173 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986)) (citing
with approval a control-based definition of woman battering that focuses on the victim's experience of the violence); Frederic B. Rodgers, Develop an Accelerated
Docket for Domestic Violence Cases, Judges' J., Summer 1992, at 2, 3 (defining battering as purposeful behavior aimed at acquiring power and control). To reflect the
reality that women are most often the victims of domestic violence, the pronoun
"she" will be used to refer to the abused individuals, and the term "woman battering"
will be used interchangeably with "domestic violence" and "domestic abuse." See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to the Nation on Crime and
Justice: The Data 21 (1983) (stating that 95% of all assaults on partners or ex-partners are committed by men); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1501 n.1 (1993) [hereinafter Developments] (stating
that women are the victims in the vast majority of cases).
2. Forty-nine states have enacted warrantless arrest statutes that create an exception to the in-presence requirement if the police officer "has probable cause to believe
that a misdemeanor has been committed or that a restraining order has been violated." Developments, supra note 1, at 1537 (noting that every state has enacted warrantless misdemeanor arrest statutes except for Alabama and West Virginia); see Ala.
Code § 15-10-3 (Supp. 1993) (creating an exception to the in-presence requirement in
certain misdemeanor situations involving domestic abuse).
3. At least 43 states have passed antistalking statutes. Robert P. Faulkner &
Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionalityof Antistalking Laws and ProposedModel Legislation, 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 2 & n.3 (1993).
4. For a sampling of specialized domestic abuse statutes, see e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann.
§§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (West Supp. 1994) (defining domestic violence crimes and specifying procedures for handling such cases); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 12-29-1 to -11 (1994)
(same); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-25-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993) (same);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 10.99.010 - .900 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (specifying criminal procedures for responding to domestic violence); W. Va. Code § 61-2-28 (Supp.
1994) (defining criminal domestic violence).
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with the tools to aggressively pursue batterers.5 Despite this development, however, and despite the ever growing body of evidence establishing woman battering as a problem of systemic proportions,6
statistics indicate that few cases are formally adjudicated.7 In many
cases, police still fail to arrest offenders,8 prosecutors still decline to
5. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 1, at x-xi.
6. Woman battering is the leading cause of injury to women ages 15 to 44, Antonia C. Novello, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, 267 JAMA
3132, 3132 (1992), and accounts for more injury episodes than auto accidents, muggings, and rape combined, Evan Stark and Anne H. Flitcraft, Spouse Abuse, in Violence in America: A Public Health Approach 123, 139 (Mark L. Rosenberg & Mary
Ann Fenley eds., 1991). According to some estimates, one-third to one-half of female
homicide victims are murdered by their male partners. Utah Task Force on Gender
and Justice, Report to the Utah Judicial Council (March 1990), reprintedin 16 J. Contemporary L. 135, 204 (1990). Woman battering transcends all barriers of wealth,
class, and race as it is "prevalent among every economic, racial and ethnic group" in
the country. Developments, supra note 1, at 1501. Although accurate estimates are
difficult to come by, due in part to the likelihood of underreporting, conservative
sources estimate that women are physically abused in 12% of all marriages, with some
scholars estimating that as many as 50% or more of women will be battering victims
at some point in their lives. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 10-11. In all, family violence
costs United States businesses $3.5 billion in absenteeism and $100 million in medical
expenses annually. Andrew Greene, Combat Domestic Violence, Burris Urges AGs,
Chi. Daily Bull., July 8, 1993, at 1 (citing speech by Illinois Attorney General Roland
Burris at a conference of the National Association of Attorneys General).
7. This Note uses the term "formal adjudication" to refer to the determination of
a criminal charge on the merits either by guilty plea or by trial.
Compare Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook 536 (1992) (32% of all offenses
dismissed) with Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal
Justice Response 58 (1990) (50%-80% of domestic violence cases dropped). A comparison of attrition rates for domestic violence cases, many of which are filed as misdemeanors, infra note 198, with attrition rates for violent misdemeanors suffers from
the paucity of statistics on misdemeanor case processing in general, Wayne R. LaFave
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 1.4(g), at 22 n.4 (2d ed. 1992). Nevertheless,
under any standard, available data indicates a pervasive practice of dismissing domestic abuse cases prior to trial. See, e.g. Rhea Mandulo, ProgramsAim at Keeping
Abuse Cases Alive, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1993, at 2 (reporting that 50%-80% of domestic
violence cases are dropped in Manhattan and the Bronx, New York); Deborah Nelson
& Rebecca Carr, Some FrustratedVictims Talk of Taking Up Arms, Chi. Sun-Times,
July 24, 1994, at 18 (finding that of 10,700 cases filed in Chicago's domestic violence
court last year, 7400 have been dropped so far); Mary O'Doherty, New Jefferson WifeAbuse Unit to Make Cases Tough to Drop, Courier-Journal, April 26, 1991, at 1A
(citing 70% dismissal rate as common to jurisdictions that make no special effort to
prosecute domestic violence). A six-jurisdiction study conducted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts found that of 224 cases
reviewed, none went to trial. Prosecutors disposed of every case either by guilty plea
or dismissal before trial, with no defendant who pled "not guilty" ever proceeding to
trial. Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, Final
Report (Sept. 1989), reprinted in 15 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 825, 884 (1989). See also
Buzawa & Buzawa, supra, at 58 (noting "extraordinarily high" attrition rates in domestic violence cases); Maureen McLeod, Victim Noncooperation in the Prosecution
of Domestic Assault, 21 Criminology 395, 408 (1983) (finding that only 2.6% of cases
brought to the attention of law enforcement in Detroit resulted in adjudication).
8. See, e.g., Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 99 (arrests made in less than 20%
of the calls in Minneapolis, Minnesota, despite adoption of mandatory arrest policy);
Ferraro & Pope, supra note 1, at 110 (arrests made in only 18% of calls in Phoenix,
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file charges, 9 and, if they do file charges, they often undercharge,1 0
and subsequently recommend dismissal.1 ' In essence, although legisto proslative enactments have removed many structural impediments
12
unchanged.
remain
practices
operational
batterers,
ecuting
The criminal justice system's continued ineffectiveness in dealing
with domestic violence should not be interpreted to mean, however,

that the legislative victories of the past fifteen years are merely symbolic. In cities and states throughout the country, committed police
commissioners, district attorneys, and attorneys general have seized
the tools provided to them by their respective legislatures to vigorously enforce domestic violence laws.' 3 These officials have worked
together with advocacy groups and community service providers to
deliver a coordinated response to domestic abuse incidents.14 MoreArizona, despite adoption of presumptive arrest policy); Michele Ingrassia et al., Patterns of Abuse, Newsweek, July 4, 1994, at 27 (arrests made in only 7% of cases in
New York City despite a mandatory arrest law); see also Developments, supra note 1,
at 1537 ("Many police departments ma[k]e little use of... expanded arrest powers,
however, and domestic violence laws continue[ ] to be underenforced."). In the state
of Washington, the enactment of a mandatory arrest law resulted in a fourfold increase in arrest rates. Unfortunately, the law also resulted in an unprecedented increase in "dual arrests"-where both spouses were arrested. Buzawa & Buzawa,
supra note 7, at 99.
9. See Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission
(March 1990), reprintedin 42 Fla. L. Rev. 803, 858 (1990) [hereinafter Florida Gender
Bias Study]; Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice (June 1993),
reprinted in 58 Mo. L. Rev. 485, 507-08 (1993) [hereinafter Missouri Task Force Report]; Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 6, at 210.
10. See infra notes 197-98.
11. See infra text accompanying note 20. See also Janell Schmidt & Ellen Hochstedler Steury, ProsecutorialDiscretion in Filing Charges in Domestic Violence Cases,
27 Criminology 487, 489 (1989) (noting that a typical response to domestic abuse includes the entry of a nolle prosequi (voluntary withdrawal of charges) by the
prosecutor).
12. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 136; see also Missouri Task Force Report,
supra note 9, at 493 (finding that despite comprehensive statutory response to domestic violence, the actual administration falls short of expectations); Vermont Task Force
Report on Gender Bias in the Legal System: Introductionand Executive Summary, 15
Vt. L. Rev. 395, 404 (1991) (finding that despite a strong domestic abuse prevention
act, the laws are not being adequately implemented or enforced).
13. See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O'Dell, Stopping the Violence: Tile Role of tile
Police Officer and the Prosecutor,20 W. St. U. L. Rev. 1501, 1511-12 & n.36 (1993)
(discussing police departments and prosecutors' offices throughout the country that
have committed to aggressive enforcement of domestic abuse laws); see also Missouri
Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 507 (noting increased willingness of prosecutors in
Kansas City, Missouri, to file state charges (instead of municipal charges) and to
charge violators with substantive offenses); Peter G. Jaffe et al., The Impact of Police
Laying Charges, in Legal Responses to Wife Assault, supra note 1, at 62, 72 (noting
pro-arrest procedures adopted by San Francisco Police Department that resulted in a
60% increase in arrests after only one year).
14. See Developments,supra note 1, at 1515-18 (highlighting local community programs that link the responses of police and prosecutors with shelters, advocates, and
treatment programs in a coordinated fashion); Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1509-11 (discussing blended task forces and their work "in coordinating.., shelters,
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over, many chief prosecutors have instituted special policies and programs within their offices to encourage victim cooperation and to
increase the number of successful prosecutions.'Of the many innovative policies that have been employed, one that
has drawn a fair amount of controversy is a prosecutorial policy called
a no-drop policy. 6 Generally defined, a no-drop policy denies the victim of domestic violence the option of freely withdrawing a complaint
once formal charges have been filed.' 7 In turn, the policy limits the
prosecutor's discretion to drop' 8 a case solely because the victim is
unwilling to cooperate.' 9

law enforcement, therapists, medical service providers, advocates, family and criminal
court staff and judges, educators, military, social services, and probation officers").
15. Naomi R. Cahn, Innovative Approaches to the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Crimes: An Overview, in Domestic Violence: The Changing Criminal Justice
Response, supra note 1, at 161, 164. Some examples of these new innovations include
victim support projects, vertical prosecution policies, and domestic violence prosecution units. Id. at 169-71. Victim support projects consist of victim advocates who
work closely with victims and prosecutors to ease a victim's experience within the
criminal justice system and hopefully encourage cooperation. Id. at 169. These advocates explain the legal process to the victim, provide counseling if necessary, accompany the victim to court, and not coincidentally, aid prosecutors in the process by
increasing victim cooperation and improving the quality of victim testimony. Id.; Gail
A. Goolkasian, Confronting Domestic Violence: A Guide for Criminal Justice Agencies 68 (1986). Vertical prosecution is a case processing strategy whereby a single
prosecutor handles the case from arraignment to sentencing. Id. at 171; David A.
Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters, in Legal Responses to Wife Assault, supra note 1, at 160 n.3. Prosecutors in special domestic
violence units primarily handle domestic abuse cases and impliedly understand the
special needs of battered victims. Goolkasian, supra, at 56.
16. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 122-23 (describing no-drop policies as
the "most extreme" change in prosecutorial response and arguing against their adoption); Developments, supra note 1, at 1541 (summarizing drawbacks of no-drop policies); N. Zoe Hilton, Introduction to Legal Responses to Wife Assault, supra note 1,
at 3, 4 (summarizing controversial changes in legal responses to domestic violence,
including no-drop policies); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing
instances of victims being jailed for defying subpoenas issued pursuant to no-drop
policies)
17. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 122 (policy "impos[ing] restrictions on
victims that effectively prevents them from freely dropping charges"); Hilton, supra
note 16, at 4 (policy "whereby the victim of wife assault does not have the option of
withdrawing charges once the prosecution process is under way"); Kathleen Waits,
The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 323 (1985).
18. The term "drop" is used synonymously and interchangeably, for purposes of
this Note, with a recommendation to dismiss or an entry of nolle prosequi.
19. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 122 ("Simultaneously, there are usually
strict limitations to prosecutorial discretion to drop charges except for demonstrated
failure of evidentiary support."). Although its name may imply otherwise, a no-drop
policy does not mandate continued prosecution in all cases. See Goolkasian, supra
note 15, at 73 (stating that "[i]n most offices that ...

have 'no-drop' policies ...

prosecutors and victim advocates examine each case carefully, and will actually dismiss charges at a victim's request under certain kinds of circumstances (if, for example, the victim's safety is believed to be at stake)").
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In many jurisdictions, prosecutors routinely drop domestic violence
cases because the victim requests it, refuses to testify, recants, or fails
to appear in court.2" In these situations, prosecutors dispose of approximately fifty to eighty percent of cases by dropping the charges.2 '
In contrast, where no-drop policies have been instituted, early reports
reveal case attrition rates ranging from ten to thirty-four percent.'
The controversy surrounding no-drop policies, for the most part, revolves around both prosecutors' and victims' aversion to relin-

quishing control of the legal process.'

Prosecutors fear that scarce

wasted in
prosecutorial resources will be stretched beyond limits and
24

pursuit of unwinnable cases due to victim nonparticipation.

Victims'

advocates, on the other hand, fear that no-drop policies will further

victimize battered women z and undercut efforts at victim empowerment.2 Moreover, some critics contend that no-drop policies may
cause unwanted "side effects," such as increasing risks of retaliation
and discouraging victim reporting.2 7
This Note examines no-drop policies, explores the impetus for their
adoption, and evaluates the policies' claimed merits and drawbacks.
Part I examines different types of no-drop policies and briefly surveys
the jurisdictions that have instituted them or addressed their adoption.
20. Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia
by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System, reprinted in 8 Ga. St. L
Rev. 539, 566 (1992) [hereinafter Georgia Gender Bias Report] (finding that
"[p]rosecutors often dismiss domestic violence cases when victims show any reluctance to cooperate"); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in
the Courts, supra note 7, at 882-83 (discussing pervasive practice of discretionary dismissals due to "the 'victim cooperation' question"); Penelope D. Clute, How Prosecutors Can Make a Difference Pro-Actively Handling Domestic Violence Cases, N.Y. St.
BJ., July/Aug. 1994, at 44 (stating that prosecutors traditionally follow the victim's
expressed wishes in the dismissal of cases); Nelson & Carr, supra note 7, at 18 (State's
Attorney estimating that "vast majority of cases dismissed without any disposition are
situations where the victim fails to show up, refuses to testify or requests to drop a
case").
21. Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 141; see also supra note 7 (discussing high
case dismissal rates in domestic abuse cases).
22. Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecution of Spouse Abuse: Innovations in Criminal Justice Response 34-35 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective ProsecutionStrategies
from Understandingthe Dynamics of Abusive Relationships,15 Hamline L Rev. 115,
136 n.95 (1991) (describing reduction in dismissal rate from 47.1% in 1987 to 23% in
1989 after the Duluth City Attorney's office adopted a "hard" no-drop policy);
O'Doherty, supra note 7, at 1A (comparing 40% dismissal rate in Fayette County,
Kentucky, which has a no-drop policy, with the 70% dismissal rate of two neighboring
counties without the policy); Kim Wessel, Court Led to Aggressive Prosecution in Indiana, Courier-Journal, June 9, 1993, at 5B (comparing 20% dismissal rate in Marion
County, Indiana, which now has a no-drop policy and a domestic abuse court, with
that same county's 1977 dismissal rate of 75% when there were no special programs).
23. See discussion infra part II.A. & part II.B.
24. See discussion infra part II.A.
25. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
26. See discussion infra part II.B.
27. See discussion infra part II.B.
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Part II explores the reasons underlying the adoption of no-drop policies, and part III evaluates the policies' claimed benefits and risks.
Finally, part IV argues that the merits of no-drop policies outweigh
their drawbacks and calls for states to enact measures promoting their
adoption. This Note concludes that no-drop policies can play an important role in combatting domestic violence because they account for
victims' realities, counteract longstanding justifications for inaction,
and transform the statutory promise of justice for battered women
into a credible threat of prosecution for their batterers.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF NO-DROP POLICIES

This part further defines no-drop policies and, in particular, explores how they are enforced in five city and county prosecutors' offices from around the country. This part also examines state and
federal responses to domestic violence that address the use of no-drop
policies.
A. No-Drop Policies Defined
A no-drop prosecution policy may be defined both as a statement
declaring that the state will not drop a domestic violence case due to
victim nonparticipation and as a practice and protocol for enforcing
that statement.
As a statement of intent to continue prosecution in spite of the victim's wishes, a no-drop policy clarifies the nature of the relationship
between the prosecutor and the victim.2" First, the policy underscores
the fact that once charges are filed, the state, and not the victim, becomes the party.2 9 Likewise, the policy emphasizes, somewhat redundantly, that the prosecutor controls the direction of the prosecution;
the victim cannot, for instance, decide to drop a case.30 On another
level, the policy represents official acknowledgment of the fear and
ambivalence victims often feel when asked to testify against their batterers. 3 ' Lastly, a no-drop policy conveys an institutional commitment
28. See Clute, supra note 20, at 45.

29. See id.; Cahn, supra note 15, at 168.
30. Cahn, supra note 15, at 167-68; see Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 72 (stating
that victims who express a desire to "drop charges" are told that the "prosecutor has a
duty to decide whether the court should be asked to dismiss a complaint"); see, e.g.,

Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Salt Lake County, Utah, Domestic Violence Policy and Protocol for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 1 (1993) (on file with

author) [hereinafter Salt Lake County Protocol] (stating that a "victim cannot 'drop'

charges or 'press' charges once the case is submitted to the County Attorney's
office").
31. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514; see Florida Gender Bias Study, supra
note 9, at 861; Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence Crime, Com-

monwealth of Kentucky, Prosecutor's Manual on Domestic Violence Crime 13 (1991)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Kentucky Prosecutor's Manual].
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on the part of the criminal justice system to treat domestic violence as
a serious crime.32

In practice, a no-drop policy regulates the use of prosecutorial dis-

cretion in instances where the victim declines to participate. 33 The

policy often comes into play after formal charges have been filed and
the victim has indicated that she will not support the prosecution. 4
Under a no-drop policy, prosecutors often are directed to: 1) pursue
most cases notwithstanding the reluctance of the victim; 35 2) stress
prosecutorial control of the case to the victim; 36 and 3) facilitate victim cooperation with state efforts.37

Strategies for effectuating these directives vary among jurisdictions.
In terms of formality, policies range from unwritten rules that are followed as matters of office custom, 38 to elaborate written protocols
32. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 73; see Waits, supra note 17, at 323 (stating that
no-drop policies convey a strong sense of societal responsibility for deterring the
batterer).
33. See City Attorney's Office, Duluth, Minnesota, Domestic Violence Prosecution Plan 1 (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Duluth Prosecution Plan] (stating
that the City Attorney's prosecution plan, which includes a no-drop policy, "provides
a framework upon which to base decisions" and "does not make up a specific set of
absolute procedures to fit the myriad possibilities [the] cases present"); see also supra
note 20.
34. Criminal domestic violence cases generally enter the legal system through onscene arrests or victim-initiated complaints. Cahn, supra note 15, at 165; Ford &
Regoli, supra note 15, at 132. At the police officer's option, on-scene arrest cases may
be referred to the prosecutor's office for formal charge screening. In cases involving
victim-initiated complaints, the prosecutor's office itself screens the case before requesting an arrest warrant or summons. Ideally, if the prosecutor has probable cause
to believe that the defendant is guilty of the crime alleged, the prosecutor formally
lodges a complaint or information at the initial presentment. For less serious offenses,
such as low level misdemeanors, the screening and formal charging may occur simultaneously. At the initial presentment, the judge informs the defendant of his rights,
sets bail and other conditions for release, and assigns counsel if one is requested. In
the case of a misdemeanor, the defendant is arraigned on the complaint, and if
needed, a trial date is set. If the case involves a felony, a preliminary hearing date will
be scheduled. The accused felon will be arraigned at that time and a trial date will be
set. Some time in between arrest and trial, the process of trial preparation and plea
bargaining begins. See LaFave & Israel, supra note 7, § 1.4, at 20-26.
35. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 72-73; see supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
36. Calm, supra note 15, at 168 (stating that the "prosecuting attorney's office explains to victims that they are witnesses for the state and that, even if they reconcile
with the defendant, the state will not drop charges"); Telephone Interview with Sandra Panico, Investigating Law Clerk, Citizens' Rights Division, Office of the Attorney
General, North Carolina (Aug. 17, 1994) (explaining that under an informal no-drop
policy, the prosecutor communicates to the parties that "it's the state's case").
37. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing use of victim advocate);
see, e.g., Salt Lake County Protocol, supra note 30, at 1 (if the victim fails to appear or
testify, an investigator or counselor will make an appointment with the victim for the
purpose of persuading her to testify).
38. Telephone Interview with Betsy Griffing, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General, Montana (Aug. 5, 1994) (stating that although there is no
formal statewide policy, "as a practical matter," prosecutors do not drop charges
based on the victim's request); Telephone Interview with Sandra Panico, supra note
36.
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that specify whether and under what circumstances prosecutors may
drop a case. 39 Some policies, for example, simply state that the prosecutors should not move to dismiss charges because of a victim's reluctance to proceed.4" Other policies further specify the steps that
should be taken, or conditions that should be fulfilled, before the
prosecutor can recommend dismissal.41 In conjunction with or as part
of such policies, some jurisdictions also address the issue of compelling victims to testify in court through the use of subpoenas. 42 The
different approaches taken by five jurisdictions are examined below.
Under the no-drop policy in Jefferson County, Kentucky, if a victim
fails to appear in court or changes her mind, the charges will not be
automatically dismissed.43 The policy recommends that the prosecutor request a postponement and obtain a sworn statement from the
victim as to why she wants to withdraw and whether she was pressured to do so.' Ultimately, the county's domestic violence unit-a
panel made up of a chief prosecutor, paralegals, and a victim advocate-must give its consent before the prosecutor can plea-bargain or
recommend dismissal of charges.45
In San Diego, California, the City Attorney's official policy states
that the prosecutor will request an arrest warrant if a subpoenaed victim fails to show up in court. 46 In practice, however, no warrant actually issues until a specially-trained domestic violence prosecutor
determines that the case cannot proceed without the victim's cooperation.4 7 In cases where other corroborating evidence, such as 911
tapes, photographs, medical records, and neighbors' or relatives' testimony, is available and deemed sufficient to prove the case, the prosecutor will not request a warrant.48 In cases that cannot be proven
39. See Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 72-73; infra notes 53-60 and accompanying
text (discussing protocol for Marion County, Indiana).
40. Telephone Interview with Terri Clarke, Deputy County Attorney, Maricopa
County District Attorney's Office, Phoenix, Arizona (Aug. 15, 1994) (explaining the
office's informal policy that charges will not be dropped solely because the victim

requests it); Telephone Interview with Mark Sandon, Domestic Abuse Prosecutor,
Polk County, Iowa (Aug. 5, 1994) (explaining the office's informal policy that prosecutor will not dismiss by reason of the victim's wishes).

41. See, e.g., St. Louis County Attorney's Office, Duluth, Minnesota, St. Louis
County Attorney's Domestic Abuse Policy 6-7 (Feb. 5, 1990) (on file with author)
(specifying steps and conditions prosecutors should take when victims recant, refuse

to testify, or fail to appear); infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (discussing protocols and procedures for Marion County, Indiana, and San Diego, California).

42. See infra notes 46-52, 61-68, and accompanying text.
43. See Kim Wessel, Support Is Sought for a Special Court on Family Violence, The
Courier-Journal, June 9, 1993, at lB.
44. O'Doherty, supra note 7, at 1A.
45. Id.; Wessel, supra note 43, at lB.

46. Office of the City Attorney, City of San Diego, Domestic Violence Prosecution Protocol 13 (April 1993) (on file with author); Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1517.

47. Id.
48. Id.
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without the victim's cooperation, the prosecutor's office will often request a continuance along with a bench warrant4 9 and, in most cases,
simultaneously attempt to locate the victim.5" Alternatively, the prosecutor may conclude that the victim is not likely to change her mind
about testifying and that the seriousness of the case does not merit her
possible incarceration. 5 ' Under these circumstances, the prosecutor
may make a motion to dismiss, subject to refiling within six months if
the victim becomes cooperative. 2
Pursuant to the no-drop policy in Marion County, Indiana, a victim
is informed initially that the prosecutor's office usually follows a nodrop policy and that the prosecutor may make an exception depending on the circumstances of the case. 3 The victim is subsequently informed that if she wishes to withdraw the charges, she must first
contact either her legal advocate or a prosecutor.54 Depending upon
the circumstances of the case, the victim may also be informed that
certain categories of crimes or offenders are summarily removed from
consideration for dismissals. No case will be dropped, for example, if
the defendant: (1) has a prior conviction; (2) has been sent a warning
letter; (3) has another case pending for an act of violence against the
same victim; or (4) is on probation and is subject to a violation for a
Moreover, no case will be dropped before the initial
new offense.
hearing.5 6 In situations where the victim requests a drop, the policy
dictates that she must be advised of the increased risk of being revictimized if charges are dropped.' The victim may also be asked to
view a video program about domestic violence and to attend a victims'
support group meeting.58 Eventually, if the victim continues to insist
on dropping the charges, she will be allowed to sign a "drop form." 59
The form will then be submitted to the court at the next hearing, after
which the judge will take it under advisement for ninety days. If no
49. Id
50. Id. In some cases, the prosecutor may ask the judge to hold the warrant and
continue the case for a week while the prosecutor attempts to notify the victim of the
pending risk of arrest. Id. at 1518. Once the victim discovers that she may be arrested, she often agrees to appear in court. Id.
51. Id. at 1517.
52. Id.
53. Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Marion County, Indiana, Domestic Violence Protocol 3 (Feb. 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Marion County
Protocol].
54. Id. Marion County's domestic violence unit has three legal advocates and victim assistance volunteers who work alongside four full-time deputy prosecutors. Id.
at 1. For a discussion on the role of victim advocates, see supra note 15.
55. Marion County Protocol, supra note 53, at 3.
56. Id
57. Id. Specifically, the victim is told that statistics demonstrate that "it is 41%
more likely that she will be the victim of repeat violence if she drops charges [versus]
7% if she doesn't drop charges." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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further violence occurs during this period, the prosecutor will file a
motion to dismiss subject to refiling during the statute of limitations
period.6 °

Prosecutors in Duluth, Minnesota, use what is termed a "hard" nodrop policy, 61 in which prosecutors will almost always pursue the case
regardless of a victim's wishes. 62 Under the Duluth policy, prosecutors will regularly subpoena all victims regardless of their willingness
to testify in an effort to shield the victim from the appearance of responsibility. 63 Because many cases involve hostile or reluctant victims, Duluth's City Attorney's office has developed procedures for the
examination of hostile witnesses and alternative means to introduce
evidence. 6' Prosecutors try to present juries with the "whole story" of
what occurred between the victim and defendant by introducing excited utterances, present sense impressions, evidence of other conduct,

and asking leading questions of the victim.65

Lastly, the San Francisco District Attorney's Office encourages vic-

tims to confer with victim advocates when the victim appears reluctant

to testify.6 6 If the victim still refuses to testify after having met with an

advocate, the prosecutor may question the victim under oath in a
manner that simultaneously elicits reasons for her reluctance and informs her (and the batterer) that she is not responsible for the case
going forward.6 7 If the victim is found in contempt, the prosecutor
will request that the disposition address the victim's needs, such as
participation in a battered women's support group or counseling. 68
60. Id.
61. Cahn, supra note 15, at 168.
62. See Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 26-27.
63. Duluth Prosecution Plan, supra note 33, at 2; Asmus, supra note 22, at 135-36;
see also Developments, supra note 1, at 1540-41 ("[A]ppearance of compulsion shields
a woman from blame and pressure.").
64. Asmus, supra note 22, at 136.
65. Id. at 139-49 (discussing applicability of Minnesota Rules of Evidence 803(2),
801(d)(1)(D), 404(b), and 611(c), and Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 to domestic
abuse cases); see Duluth Prosecution Plan, supra note 33, at 3-4 (stating that the City
Attorney's Office will work with Duluth police to develop methods for gathering and
preserving evidence such as statements of victims and perpetrators at or near the time
of the incident, statements by other witnesses, physical evidence of any injuries, and
evidence regarding prior conduct or history of abuse).
66. District Attorney's Office, San Francisco, California, Domestic Violence Prosecution Protocol 19 (Feb. 1, 1992) (on file with author). Victim advocates educate
victims about their legal options and sometimes engage in crisis counseling. As specified by law, communications between a victim and a domestic violence victim advocate are confidential. Id. at 21.
67. Id. at 19-20. Prosecutors ask questions such as: "You don't want to be here,
do you?" "Are you aware that the People of the State of California are bringing
these charges, and that the decision to prosecute the defendant is up to the prosecutor
rather than you?" "When did you become reluctant to testify?" "How did you receive the injuries?" Id.
68. Id. at 20. California law provides such sentencing alternatives for victims of
domestic abuse. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.

1994]

NO-DROP POLICIES

B.

Survey of No-Drop Policies

Currently, four states have passed legislation encouraging the use of
no-drop policies. 69 Pursuant to a joint house resolution and as a matter of state policy, prosecutors and judges in Utah are encouraged to
adopt no-drop policies and to refrain from dropping charges based
solely on a victim's request.7" Similarly, Wisconsin law directs all district attorneys' offices to "develop, adopt and implement written poli-

cies" which, among other things, indicate "that a prosecutor's decision
not to prosecute.., should not be based... [u]pon the victim's consent to any subsequent prosecution of the other person."71 Florida
law recommends the adoption of "pro-prosecution" policies in general
and highlights the reluctance of the victim as a factor that may be
disregarded in deciding whether to file or divert 72 cases. 73 Using a
somewhat different approach, Minnesota law requires all county and
city attorneys to develop prosecution plans that address methods for
gathering evidence exclusive of the victim's in-court testimony and
identify procedures for use of victim subpoenas. 74
69. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901 (West Supp. 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 611A.0311 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); H.RJ. Res. 3, 48th Leg., 1990 Gen. Sess.,
1990 Utah Laws 1543; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075(7) (Supp. 1994). Although domestic
abuse statutes in other states contain "legislative intent" provisions encouraging
proactive prosecution of domestic violence crimes, only the four states mentioned
above specifically address the impact of victim nonparticipation and discretionary dismissals in the disposition of domestic violence cases. See, eg., Cal. Penal Code § 273.8
(West Supp. 1994) (stating that legislature "intends to support increased efforts by
district attorneys' and city attorneys' offices to prosecute spousal abusers," but not
mentioning issue of victim reluctance); Idaho Code § 39-6302 (Michie 1993) (finding
that domestic violence can be "deterred, prevented or reduced" through vigorous
prosecution by prosecutors, but not addressing the impact of victim nonparticipation);
NJ. Code 2C:25-18 (West Supp. 1994) (encouraging broad application of remedies in
criminal courts but not addressing impact of victim nonparticipation).
70. The legislation is entitled "A Joint Resolution of the Legislature Urging Prosecutors to Develop and Implement a 'No-Drop' Policy," and states:
BE IT RESOLVED that the Legislature encourages prosecution of domestic
violence perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law, encourages prosecutors
and courts not to drop domestic violence charges at the request of the victim, and urges the state, whenever necessary, to act as complainant instead
of the victim in a domestic violence case.
H.RJ. Res. 3, 48th Leg., 1990 Gen. Sess., 1990 Utah Laws 1543.
71. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075(7)(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
72. Diversion is an alternative to formal criminal proceedings. "Typically the
prosecutor suspends prosecution in exchange for the defendant's agreement to make
restitution for an offense or to submit to rehabilitative counseling." Stephen A.
Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary
662 (4th ed. 1992).
73. Florida laws provide that:
The state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy for
acts of domestic violence, as defined in § 741.28. The filing, nonfiling, or
diversion of criminal charges shall be determined by these specialized prosecutors over the objection of the victim, if necessary.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.2901(2) (West Supp. 1994).
74. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611A.0311(b)(5), (b)(7) (Vest 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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Although California lawmakers have not passed legislation specifically advocating no-drop policies, California law implicitly recognizes
local use of such policies by according special treatment to victims
who refuse to testify. Under section 1219 of California's Civil Procedure Code, judges are prohibited from jailing a domestic violence victim on the first contempt finding for refusal to testify.75 Instead of jail,
the judge may order the victim to attend a domestic violence program
for victims, or to perform up to seventy-two hours of community sersentence a victim to jail only after a second
vice.7 6 The judge may
7

finding of contempt. 1
At the federal level, the adoption of no-drop policies is encouraged
by the Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992.78 Section 10415 authorizes Model State leadership
grants to be given to states that have statewide prosecution policies
79
that include either a no-drop policy or a vertical prosecution policy.
In some states that do not have specific legislation relating to nodrop policies, the attorney general's office has set forth such a policy
or has officially endorsed its adoption.8 0 In Rhode Island, for example, the attorney general's office enforces an unwritten policy stating
75. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1219 (West Supp. 1994). It is possible, however, that
the victim may still be jailed on an arrest warrant prior to the first contempt finding.
Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1518 n.43.
76. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1219(c). The victim may be sentenced to attend a victims' support group meeting. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1518 n.43.
77. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1219(c).
78. Pub. L. No. 102-295, 106 Stat. 187 (1992).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 10415 (Supp. 1993). In order to be eligible for a grant, a state must
have:
(2) statewide prosecution policies that(A) authorize and encourage prosecutors to pursue cases where a criminal case can be proved, including proceeding without the active involvement of the victim if necessary; and
(B) implement model projects that include either(i) a "no-drop" prosecution policy; or
(ii) a vertical prosecution policy...
42 U.S.C. 10415(b) (Supp. 1993).
80. An informal telephone survey of states that had no legislation relating to nodrop policies revealed several attorneys general's offices that used a no-drop policy or
encouraged their adoption statewide. See, e.g., Kentucky Prosecutor's Manual, supra
note 31, at 15 (recommending emergency implementation of no-drop policies on a
statewide level); Telephone Interview with Betsy Griffing, supra note 38 (explaining
the informal policy at Montana Attorney General's Office); Telephone Interview with
Sandra Panico, supra note 36 (describing the informal no-drop policy at the North
Carolina Attorney General's Office); Telephone Interview with David Prior, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Rhode Island (Aug. 15, 1994) (describing
the unwritten no-drop policy at the Rhode Island Attorney General's Office); see also
Telephone Interview with William J. Zaorski, Deputy Attorney General, Division of
Criminal Justice, Department of Law & Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General, New Jersey (Aug. 18, 1994) (stating that the Attorney General's office is currently developing a course on proving cases without victim assistance).
Because the office of the attorney general in most of the states surveyed exercised
no direct jurisdiction over the class of crimes often filed in domestic violence cases,
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that charges will not be dropped until the victim has gone to court and

testifies that she is unwilling to testify.-" In Kentucky, the Attorney
General's Task Force on Domestic Violence recommends the "emergency" implementation of no-drop policies at both the state and local
levels.'n
II.

THE IMPETUS FOR

A No-DROP SOLUTION

The legal literature on domestic violence has identified two factors
that account for the high attrition rates of such cases. 3 Under the

general rubric of "legal noncooperation," some critics contend that
criminal justice personnel, including prosecutors, lack the commitment to enforce domestic violence laws, and therefore, tacitly and

overtly discourage victims.' 4 Under the rubric of "victim noncooperation," some observers assert that victims often forgive or accede to
batterers' demands, thereby frustrating and sometimes abusing state
efforts at prosecution.s

Clearly, the interplay of these two factors serves to perpetuate the
problem of aborted prosecutions.8 6 The nature of the interaction between victims and prosecutors, for example, serves to reinforce each

side's beliefs and behaviors and ultimately impacts their view of the
role prosecution can play in ending the violence.' Moreover, in this
atmosphere of mutual distrust, the batterer's role in affecting the ultimany offices perceived no need or cause for the attorney general to implement or
issue a policy statement relating to no-drop policies.
81. See Telephone Interview with David Prior, supra note 80.
82. Kentucky Prosecutor's Manual, supra note 31, at 15.
83. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 58; Minnesota Supreme Court Task
Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, 882-84; Missouri Task Force
Report, supra note 9, at 493.
84. Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 36 Am. Behavioral Sci. 624, 626-27 (1993); McLeod, supra note 7, at 394; Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force, FinalRepor" Gender Bias Task Force, 6 Wis. Women's LJ.173, 18388 (1991).
85. See Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 55; Missouri Task Force Report, supra note
9, at 493 ("Officials working in the system view the shortfalls in effectiveness [of the
administration of domestic violence laws] as the result of victims' perplexing and selfperpetuating unwillingness to pursue criminal prosecution and court-ordered protection."); cf. Kerry G. Wangberg, Reducing Case Attrition in Domestic Violence Cases:
A Prosecutor'sPerspedtive, The Prosecutor, Winter 1991, at 8 ("High case attrition
rates in domestic violence can generally be classified under the general rubric of "victim reluctance.").
86. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 56 (stating that battered women often are reluctant to follow through with prosecution and that prosecutors' traditional approach to
handling domestic violence cases serves to increase, rather than minimize their reluctance); cf.Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 1, at xvii (discussing cycle of nonprosecution
due to victims' failure to cooperate and prosecutors' lack of support or apparent
indifference).
87. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 1, at xvii; Cahn, supra note 15, at 163.
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mate outcome of his case receives limited consideration. 8 As one city
prosecutor described this cycle of aborted prosecutions:
[I]t was a self-fulfilling prophesy. We'd file if she really wanted us
to, but we knew that she'd want us to drop charges later.., we may
have even told her so. Then we sent her back home, often back to
her abuser, without any support or protection at all. Sure enough,
"It's always the same
she wouldn't follow
89 through and we'd think,
with these cases."

Part II explores the reasons and constraints underlying prosecutors'
reluctance to pursue domestic violence cases and the ways in which
prosecutors have dissuaded victims from seeking full criminal justice
relief. This part also examines the reasons and motivations behind
victims' reluctance to cooperate.
A. ProsecutorialNoncooperation

A prosecutor's power to forgo or to proceed with prosecution in
as a power that involves
domestic violence cases has been described
"great latitude and little accountability." 90 Although statutes or judicial review set some outside limits on this power,9 1 a prosecutor's deci-

sion to terminate prosecution is seldom challenged. 9 In general,
society allows prosecutors to set priorities and enforce the law with
discretion because of limited justice resources, legislative "overcriminalization," and society's belief in individualized justice.9 3 In the

88. See Sarah Eaton & Ariella Hyman, The Domestic Violence Component of the
New York Task ForceReport on Women in the Courts: An Evaluationand Assessment
of New York City Courts, 19 Ford. Urban L.J. 391, 425-26 (1992) (discussing lack of
awareness among judges and prosecutors as to why battered women wish to drop
charges and, in particular, the role batterer intimidation plays in deterring their victims); cf. Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition:
Perspectiveson Male Batteringof Women, 23 U. Chi. Legal F. 23, 38 (1989) (noting in
a discussion of battered women's syndrome that: "[Tihe law in its present cast is...
able to maintain an absolute focus on whether the battered woman "chose" correctly
between the risk of leaving and the risk of staying and away from whether men should
be able to impose either set of risks on us."); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 53-54 (stating
that legal literature often focuses on the psychology of the victim and often ignores
the "interplay of power and control, domination and subordination in the battering
relationship").
89. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 55.
90. Cahn, supra note 15, at 162.
91. Id.; see, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-3-22 (Supp. 1994) (requiring
prosecutors to specify reasons for not continuing prosecution); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 968.075(7) (1993) (same).
92. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary 14 (1980) (noting that judges
seldom deny a prosecutor's motion to withdraw prosecution); LaFave & Israel, supra
note 7, § 13.3(c) (noting perfunctory nature of judicial approval in state motions to
terminate prosecutions).
93. LaFave & Israel, supra note 7, § 13.2(a); Salzburg & Capra, supra note 72, at
653-54.
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area of domestic violence cases, however, prosecutors often choose to
exercise discretion by not proceeding or later dismissing charges.9
A complex set of motivations and constraints underlie prosecutors'
reluctance to prosecute domestic violence cases. For the most part,
prosecutors fail to understand the harms and dynamics of woman bat-

tering.95 Some prosecutors believe, for instance, that the violence is

trivial, that victims are somehow to blame, 96 and that the public order
is not affected. 97 Still others question the wisdom of state intervention

in familial relationships.98
Some prosecutors choose to drop cases because of expectations,
often based on experience, that the victim will ultimately change her
mind about prosecution.99 Because the victim is often the only witness to the violence, such cases can be extremely difficult to prove

without the victim's testimony." ° Likewise, the general tendency of
juries to try the victim instead of the defendant in a nonstranger

case' ° ' also taints the prosecutor's view of the likelihood of
conviction.' 02
Organizational goals and incentives also influence decisions to
forgo or terminate prosecutions. Trying domestic violence cases without favorable victim testimony hardly coincides, for instance, with the
bureaucratic goals of achieving higher conviction rates 0 3 and conserving limited prosecutorial resources.) 4 Moreover, because other jus-

94. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 1, at xvi; Cahn, supra note 15, at 162; McLeod,
supra note 7, at 398.
95. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 88, at 481-82; Florida Gender Bias Study, supra
note 9, at 861; Georgia Gender Bias Report, supra note 20, at 552; Missouri Task
Force Report, supra note 9, at 506; Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra
note 6, at 211; Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force, supra note 84, at 186.
96. Cahn, supra note 15, at 162-63.
97. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 58; see Cahn, supra note 15, at 162 (quoting a former supervisor at a prosecutor's office who stated that "[ilnteractionbetween
people who know each other is really different in kind than violent behavior directed
towards strangers") (alterations in original) (citations omitted); Eaton & Hyman,
supra note 88, at 456 (noting assessment by victim advocates that assistant district
attorneys do not think of domestic violence as "real" crimes, like murder or drug
trafficking).
98. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 58; Schmidt & Steury, supra note 11, at
488.
99. Asmus et. al, supra note 22, at 135; Cahn, supra note 15, at 163; Minnesota
Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, at 883.
100. Cahn, supra note 15, at 163; Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender
Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, at 884; cf. Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 135
("Traditionally, [the victim's willingness to cooperate] has been viewed as central to
the likelihood of obtaining a conviction.").
101. See Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 131; Clute, supra note 20, at 44.
102. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 55; Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 131.
103. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 61; Schmidt & Steury, supra note 11,
at 488.
104. As one prosecutor admits: "It must be acknowledged that it has been easier to
let victims 'drop charges' than to create a resource intensive system which takes over
responsibility for the criminal prosecution. Effective criminal prosecution without the
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tice personnel, including chief prosecutors and judges, fail to treat
domestic abuse cases with the same level of seriousness as other
crimes, deputy prosecutors receive no incentive to vigorously pursue
these types of cases. °5
Prosecutors have contributed to victims' ambivalence about the
criminal justice process by behaving in ways that reflect their underlying resistance to pursue domestic violence cases. 106 In contrast with
other kinds of crimes, for instance, many prosecutors abdicate control

for dismissing cases to victims.' 07 In doing so, prosecutors not only

make the victim feel responsible for any action taken against the batterer, 10 8 but also force the victim to constantly reaffirm what was a
traumatic decision to prosecute in the first place. 0 9 Moreover, this
arrangement virtually invites batterers to intimidate victims into with-

drawing the charges." 0

Prosecutors also influence battered women's decision to drop
charges by urging reconciliation or otherwise discouraging pursuit of
victim's involvement costs money." Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514 n.38. See
also Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 57 (discussing the crisis of excessive
caseloads and attempts by prosecutors to informally reduce caseloads through diversion or outright dismissal).
105. See Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 55 (noting that practices and policies within
the justice system reinforce the message that "handling domestic violence case [will]
do little to advance a prosecutor's career"); Developments, supra note 1, at 1555.
106. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 58; Cahn, supra note 15, at 162.
107. Clute, supra note 20, at 44; see Georgia Gender Bias Report, supra note 20, at
567 ("In many other nondomestic cases involving violent injury, the State usually does
not shift the burden of deciding whether to prosecute to the victim.... However ....
the State often shifts the burden of deciding whether or not to prosecute onto the
victim in domestic violence cases."); Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, at 885 (noting a "de facto delegation of the
prosecutorial responsibility to enforce the domestic violence laws to the victims of the
crime"). Notably, the prosecutor's abdication of control relates only to the decision
to drop. Thus, where victims insist on pursuing criminal relief, prosecutors retain control of the decisionmaking. See Schmidt & Steury, supra note 11, at 499 (finding that
leniency was shown to defendants in more than half the cases through nolle prosequi,
hold-open, or diversion dispositions despite victim wishes to the contrary).
108. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 58; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1514; cf. Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts,
supra note 7, at 885 (stating that it "is contrary to the principles of [the legal] system
to even indirectly hold victims of domestic violence responsible for law
enforcement").
109. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 61; cf.Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at
141 ("Prosecutors test victims' commitment to 'following through' by asking if they
really want to prosecute.").
110. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514. As the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Commission explained by way of quoting one attorney's testimony:
[If] the defendant knows that the woman has the capability of dropping the
charge, he's going to beat her, he's gonna make her eat the restraining order
...he'll make her crawl on the ground and eat cigarettes[,] and every other
kind of abuse you can imagine as long as she has the potential to drop it,
that's going to happen.
Florida Gender Bias Study, supra note 9, at 861 (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
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criminal relief."' Some prosecutors discourage victims tacitly by2
questioning the victim in a manner that conveys blame or disbelief,"
or by actively outlining the disadvantages of prosecution." 3 A few
give victims distorted or incomplete legal
information that thwart
14
them from seeking the state's assistance.'
Finally, prosecutors dissuade battered women indirectly by downplaying the seriousness of the crimes. Some prosecutors, for instance,
undercharge domestic abuse cases by filing them as misdemeanors
when circumstances warrant felony charges." 5 In some jurisdictions,
prosecutors delay charging or following up on the victim." 6 Some
prosecutors have gone so far as to impose mandatory waiting or "cooling off" periods." 7 Still, in other jurisdictions, prosecutors attempt to
mediate cases or recommend counseling. 18 This policy sends a
111. See Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 141; Georgia Gender Bias Report, supra
note 20, at 566 ("Some witnesses indicated that prosecutors frequently encourage the
victim not to go forward, but to seek counseling or mediation ....); Utah Task Force
on Gender and Justice, supra note 6, at 211 (indicating that 27% of prosecutors report
that they "sometimes" or "often" urge reconciliation even when the abuse is severe).
112. Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 130 (Women often are made to feel responsible for their own victimization through screening questions: "Are you still living with
this man?" "Are you married to him?" "Have you filed for divorce?" "Why do you
stay with him?").
113. Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 141. Some prosecutors seemingly list all the
possible reasons why a victim should not support the prosecution: "that it will cost
the defendant money that might better be spent on the family's support; that it will
create more stress and conflict in the relationship; that it will anger the defendant to
the point of his retaliating; [and] that prosecution cannot guarantee security." Il
114. Hearings conducted by the Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice highlighted
instances where prosecutors told victims that: 1) protective orders are not available if
the offense occurred at the couple's residence; 2) a victim may get only one protective
order during her lifetime; and 3) protective orders are not available if the victim is
already divorced and did not obtain a permanent restraining order in her divorce
decree. Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 6, at 211. One victim who
testified recounted a story of a prosecutor who simply told her that a restraining order
was not available. Not knowing the difference between a protective and a restraining
order, the victim was never informed of the difference or the procedures for obtaining
a restraining order in civil court. Id. See also Eaton & Hyman, supra note 88, at 427
(stating that some battered women are dissuaded due to unclear or incorrect
information).
115. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
116. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 88, at 462 ("[T]oo much time passes before
ADAs make contact with battered women."); Hart, supra note 84, at 627; Missouri
Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 508.
117. See Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 131. Prosecutors generally delay the
charging decision in the hope that the victim will "cool down" and withdraw charges.
Prosecutors attribute their reluctance to charge to: 1) the minor nature of the disputes; 2) the strain on judicial resources; and 3) strain that formal proceedings place
on a continuing relationship. Salzburg & Capra, supra note 72, at 663.
118. Salzburg & Capra, supra note 81, at 663; Georgia Gender Bias Report, supra
note 21, at 566; see Florida Gender Bias Study, supra note 6, at 861 (stating that some
counties have a policy of sending domestic assault cases to mediation). Prosecutors,
for example, refer the case to a social agency or present it to a member of the prosecutor's office for an informal hearing. Salzburg & Capra, supra note 81, at 663. If
neither party appears at the hearing, the prosecutor assumes the dispute has been
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message to the victim that the system does not view the batterer's
conduct as a crime and that she may be partly responsible for the incident.119 Not surprisingly, many victims become discouraged with the
legal process and decide that the costs of prosecution outweigh any
potential benefits. 2 '

B.

Victim Noncooperation

Much like other victims of violent crimes, battered women enter the
justice system unaware of the realities of the modern criminal justice
process. 121 Like other victims, battered women are unprepared for
the number of court appearances, 2 z the lack of input they have about
plea negotiations and sentencing," 2 and the amount of protection the
defendant receives for his constitutional rights.124 Victims who expect
that the process will be predictable and straightforward often are left
feeling dissatisfied with the justice system.'2 5
Unlike other victims of violent crimes, a woman battered by a current or former intimate partner encounters increased barriers to participation. In many instances, battered women face an increased risk
of intimidation and reprisal. 26 The common phenomenon of "recapture"-women being assaulted and coerced back into relationships
that they had previously chosen to leave-reveals most convincingly
the limited avenues of escape available to battered women.' 2 7 As a
resolved and drops the case. If only one of the parties appears, the prosecutor schedules another meeting rather than charge the suspect. Where both parties appear, the
dispute is usually "talked out" and no prosecution ensues. Id.
119. See Georgia Gender Bias Report, supra note 20, at 570; cf. Florida Gender
Bias Study, supra note 9, at 862 ("[In mediation, t]he criminal aspects of the assault
are brushed aside, implying that the victim had some culpability.").
120. Hart, supra note 84, at 627; see Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 130-31; cf.
Cahn, supra note 15, at 163 ("Victims learn not to rely on the criminal justice system
for help.").
121. See Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 55-56; Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 130;
Hart, supra note 84, at 624.
122. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 56; see Hart, supra note 84, at 624.
123. Cf. Hart, supra note 84, at 624 (stating that battered women want input in
decisions whereas the judicial system precludes such participation). Despite recent
legislative enactments giving victims the power to affect sentencing through victim
impact statements, reports indicate that victims remain unaware, and prosecutors neglect to advise them, of these reforms. See generally Deborah P. Kelly, Have Victim
Reforms Gone Too Far-orNot Far Enough?, 6 Crim. Just. 22, 22 (1991) (reviewing
victims' rights reforms and concluding that such rights are often underutilized).
124. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 1, at xvii.
125. Id.
126. A domestic abuse victim is more than twice as likely as other victims of violent
crimes to be revictimized within six months after the assault that gave rise to the legal
intervention. Hart, supra note 84, at 625. Furthermore, when she is assaulted, she is
likely to be assaulted an average of three times, compared with once for other victims
of violent crimes. Id.
127. See Littleton, supra note 88, at 36; see also Hart, supra note 84, at 626
("Although not all batterers engage in escalated violence during the pendency of
prosecution, as many as half threaten retaliatory violence, and at least 30% of batter-
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victim of violent crime who is often ignorant or distrustful of the legal
system, the battered woman also encounters victim-blaming and trivi-

alizing behaviors by justice personnel.'" Moreover, if children are involved, a woman's traditional role as caretaker exacerbates the

frustrating experience of returning to court time and time again to
prevent further contact. 12 9 Lastly, where the woman has no income

independent of the batterer, the decision to30 continue prosecution may
result in destitution for the entire family.1

Because of the victim's status as a woman, she is also vulnerable to
a host of uniquely potent constraints and pressures that impact her
ability to invoke and support prosecution. 131 As Professor Christine
Littleton explains, the "solution" of separation-the law's most coman especially problematic
mon response to conflict' 32-presents
choice for women because separation conflicts with impulses to seek
connection. 33 Whether such impulses are "authentic" or simply a
"habit of compliance" with societal norms,"3 the legal framework
under which women live disregards the lives of battered women in two
ways. The law misinterprets or ignores the connection that all women
value (by attributing the violence to some failure in the victim's psyseparation and continchology) and assumes that the choice between
35
ued abuse actually exists for most women.'
ers may inflict further assaults during the predisposition phase of prosecution.")
(citations omitted). See generally Mahoney, supra note 1, at 65-71 (naming the phenomenon of separation assault and reviewing cases where the victim's invocation of
the criminal process resulted in violence escalation).
128. See Eaton & Hyman, supra note 88, at 423, 482; Hart, supra note 84, at 626-27;
Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note
7, at 885. See also supra notes 108-09, 118-20, and accompanying text.
129. See Hart, supra note 84, at 628 (discussing the inconvenience of attending multiple court hearings due to the difficulty of securing reliable childcare); Mandulo,
supra note 7, at 2.
130. Missouri Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 497. In State er rel Williams v.
Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982), the Supreme Court of Missouri stated that
"[t]he most compelling reason for an abused woman to remain in the home subject to
more abuse is her financial dependency; this is particularly true for the women with
children."
131. Cf.Littleton, supra note 88, at 47-49 (discussing the asymmetry of power between women and men and how that asymmetry has made women "intensely, intimately vulnerable to betrayal, abuse and murder" in their intimate relationships with
men); Ferraro & Pope, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining the system of culture and law
that reinforces the ideology of romantic love).
132. Littleton, supra note 88, at 50 (noting that the law's "most common response
to conflict is to separate, to keep individuals from interfering with each other's ends").
133. Id.at 43-47 (explaining that "women may stay in relationships that are physically dangerous to them because they value connection"); cf Ferraro & Pope, supra
note 1, at 102 (noting that women live in a "culture of relations" where relationships
and family are important, and that the criminal justice system's usual response is to
overlay the "culture of power" on strategies for helping women).
134. Littleton, supra note 88, at 49.
135. Id. at 47-49; see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text (discussing repetition and escalation of violence after victims press charges). The shortage of battered
women's shelters makes separation even more problematic. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil
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A battered woman's need for connection is perhaps most closely
identified with instances of reconciliation with her batterer. This,
however, is not the only or even the most usual case. 36 Often, a woman's connection to her children can keep her within an abusive relationship. 137 In addition, a batterer may threaten to challenge
custody, 138 or make the victim feel guilty about depriving the children

of their father's companionship. 3 9
Some victims withdraw from prosecution because they have effectively wielded the threat of prosecution as a "power resource" in bargaining for their own safety.' 40 By forging an alliance with criminal
justice agents through the institution of criminal proceedings, the victim may have finally achieved her own goal of separation from the
batterer in relative safety. 41 Alternatively, because the victim has attained some measure of power through the institution of criminal
pro142
ceedings, she may feel assured in continuing the relationship.
Finally, some battered women drop charges of abuse when the legal
process fails to assure them that the decision to prosecute is safer than

Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1041, 1051 (1991). Lack of economic support and a place to go
force many women to go back home to their abusers. S. Rep. No. 164, 102nd Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 133, 137. According to statistics,
their fear of destitution is well-founded. There is a high rate of homelessness for
women who leave their batterers. As one study noted, "Over 50% of homeless women are escaping domestic violence." Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 120. In New
York City, more than 40% of the women on the streets are thought to be victims of
domestic violence. S. Rep. No. 164, supra, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 133, 137.
136. See Hart, supra note 84, at 628 ("Although it is commonly believed that battered women withdraw cooperation because of decisions to reconcile with defendants,
research reveals that this is not typically the reason for the request to terminate
prosecution.").
137. Littleton, supra note 88, at 54. There is an acute shortage of battered women's
shelters, few of which will accept women with children. Cahn, supra note 135, at 1051.
138. See Mahoney, supra note 1, at 44; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularityand
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practicein Work on Woman-Abuse, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 520, 555 (1992) ("[M]any battering men fight the issuance of restraining orders by initiating divorce and custody proceedings against battered women."). Women have good reason to fear men's threats. In contested custody cases,
men receive custody 60% of the time. Littleton, supra note 88, at 54 (citing Lenore J.
Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 233 (1985)).
139. Cf. Littleton, supra note 88, at 54 ("[Batterers] typically know how to manipulate women's fear of losing [children]."); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 44-45.
140. Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 142.
141. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 123; Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at
142; cf. Hilton, supra note 16, at 5 ("[A] woman who is trying to end a violent relationship might fear having to face the offender in court and risk him knowing of her
whereabouts.").
142. Some women may request the withdrawal of charges because the initiation of
prosecution alone seems to have produced the desired changes in the defendant's
behavior. Hart, supra note 84, at 628; see also Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 123
(stating that victims may drop charges after they have achieved greater power status
in the relationship).
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staying in the violent relationship.' 43 As one battered woman
observed:
I was afraid every second. If I refused to testify he would maybe
not blame me for getting arrested. If I testified and he didn't get
convicted he'd have more power over me than ever before. If I
testified and he didn't get jail time, I'd be in the same boat. It
seemed like there were about eight scenarios that would go against
me and only one that would work out. 144
III.

BENEFITS

& DRAWBACKS OF No-DROP POLICIES

The arrival of no-drop policies has been met with both approval and
alarm. This part explores the arguments for and against no-drop policies and further tests those arguments against the experience of jurisdictions that have adopted them.
A. Benefits
Advocates of no-drop policies argue that they are highly effective at
reducing high case attrition rates and facilitating the cooperation of
victims. Indeed, early reports show that the policies are quite successful. Case dismissal rates range from ten to thirty-five percent com-

pared with fifty to eighty percent dismissal rates in jurisdictions that
have not adopted a no-drop approach. 4 Some limited data indicate
that in jurisdictions with no-drop policies, victims fully cooperate with
prosecutors insixty-five to ninety-five percent of cases. 14 6 Fewer vic143. Cahn, supra note 15, at 163; see Hart, supra note 84, at 626 ("Criminal justice
system personnel too often believe that battered women will be safer and less exposed
to life-jeopardizing violence once they are separated from the offender. Quite to the
contrary, evidence of the gravity of violence inflicted after separation of the couple is
substantial."). Kathleen Ferraro explains a battered woman's framework for making
choices this way:
Responding to physical violence entails a wide repertoire of strategies of
survival, some of which are invisible to outsiders.... Survival strategies involve scrutinizing an array of individuals and institutions for effectiveness.
Within the bounds of her relationship, the woman must evaluate each resource as making a positive or negative contribution to the safety of herself
and her children. The demands of maintaining a delicate balance of outside
interference add to the complexity of calculating safety. Any resource that
upsets that balance threatens her survival.
Ferraro & Pope, supra note 1, at 106.
144. Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 130.
145. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text; see also Missouri Task Force
Report, supra note 9, at 527 (stating that "[no-dismissal polices have been successfully implemented in many communities in the United States, including some in

Missouri").

146. McLeod, supra note 7, at 401. The reported figures refer to jurisdictions that
have proactive prosecution programs and policies, including no-drop policies. Proactive prosecution programs include victim support services that encourage victims to
continue with prosecution. The decision to drop or continue prosecution under these
programs ultimately lies with the victim. Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

tims ask that charges be dismissed, 47 and some victims who initially
148
ask for a drop, end up cooperating fully.
Some prosecutors and advocates also assert that no-drop policies
have affected the batterer's conduct towards the victim. As several of
them have observed, some batterers cease harassing their victims after

they discover that the victim no longer controls the case. 149 Some
prosecutors contend that batterers more readily plead guilty to the
charges once they realize that the case will not be dismissed.' 50 Furthermore, under a rational offender theory, the threat of certain prosecution is asserted to have a deterrent impact on the batterer's future

behavior.' 5 '
Prosecutors, who can no longer cite "victim noncooperation" as a
legitimate reason to dismiss a case, have learned to prosecute cases
without the benefit of victim testimony. 152 Prosecutors utilize police
investigation resources more fully and apply evidentiary rules to these
53
"victimless prosecution" cases more creatively.

The so-called "didactic" function of no-drop policies is also asserted
to impart significant benefits. From the standpoint of legal inaction,
no-drop policies convey to the prosecutor that the victim should not
be the "leader of prosecutorial efforts.' 54 Additionally, it conveys to
deputy prosecutors the strong state interest involved-that the state,
15
and not just the victim, is harmed by the batterer's conduct.

5

From the standpoint of victim noncooperation, no-drop policies
also are asserted to convey to the victim society's assessment of the

pains inflicted on her. 56 Batterers, in turn, receive the message that
their1 5behavior
is no longer tolerated by the state and is punishable by
7
law.

147. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514 ("Once prosecutors and police officers
stop asking victims whether they want to press charges, they quickly find that victims
stop asking to press charges or drop charges.").
148. Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 136-37.
149. See id. at 118; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514.
150. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 73; Developments, supra note 1, at 1540 (Susan
Kaplan, Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney, commented: "Once the [batterer] realizes, 'Hey this is a crime, this is prosecutable'; he pleads guilty right there."); Waits,
supra note 17, at 323.
151. Ferraro & Pope, supra note 1, at 101-02 ("Rational choice deterrence theory
posits that men who batter will ponder the chance of punitive consequences before
inflicting violence on wives and lovers.").
152. See Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 134-140; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1517; supra notes 46-52, 61-68, and accompanying text.
153. See Asmus et al., supra note 22, at 139-49; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1512-13.
154. Cahn, supra note 15, at 163; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1505.
155. Cf supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing effect of low prioritization of domestic violence cases on deputy prosecutors).
156. Goolkasian, supra note 15, at 73 ("Having an official 'no-drop' policy demonstrates the prosecutor's view that spouse abuse is a serious crime."); Cahn, supra note
15, at 163.
157. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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B. Drawbacks
The adoption of no-drop policies also raises significant concerns
due to their effects on the role of prosecutors and the plight of victims.
1. Prosecutorial Concerns
If adopted legislatively, no-drop policies could lead to encroachments into areas traditionally left to prosecutorial discretion and perhaps violate the separation of powers between the three branches of
state government. 158 Further, undue restrictions on a prosecutor's
power to forgo prosecution could subvert the goal of individualized
justice. No-drop policies may restrict inquiry into the multitude of
factors often examined by prosecutors to guarantee that government
action against an individual is justified.159
No-drop policies could also lead to waste in prosecutorial resources.
Without the cooperation of the victim, convictions will most likely
prove more difficult to secure' 6° No-drop policies could force prosecutors to proceed with cases they would otherwise drop due to the low
chances of winning. 161 In the end, prosecutors' efforts could have
been better used in cases in which convictions were easier to secure.' 62
Finally, in light of budgetary constraints in local governments and
shortages in prosecutorial resources, excessive focus on domestic violence cases, which are mostly misdemeanors in nature, could divert
resources away from more serious cases. 6 3

2. Victim Concerns
Concerns about the possible effects of no-drop policies frequently
focus on the victim's safety. Prosecutors and advocates often fear that
the continued prosecution of some domestic violence cases will expose
battered women to retaliation from their batterers.' 6 Because prosecutors cannot guarantee victims' safety, no-drop policies that use subpoenas to compel victims to testify could potentially subject the
victims to further victimization. 65 And, victims' safety can be further
endangered if no-drop policies inadvertently lead to battered women
refraining from calling the police. 166
158. Cahn, supra note 15, at 163.
159. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 122-23.
160. Id.
161. Cf. Developments, supra note 1, at 1556 (noting that prosecutors often drop
domestic violence cases due to the perception that they are unwinnable).
162. See Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 122.

163. Id. at 123.
164. Hart, supra note 84, at 627 (discussing predisposition phase violence).
165. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1541; Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at
1516-17.
166. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 123.
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Many victim advocates fear that victims will be revictimized by the
Because the manner in which no-drop policies will be enforced depends to a large degree on the good faith and discretion of
prosecutors themselves, victims and their advocates anticipate that
prosecutorial and organizational interests will often override victim
concerns. 68 Instances of victims169
being jailed for contempt have been
reported in several jurisdictions.
Some critics contend that no-drop policies serve to undermine battered women's attempts at empowerment. By denying a victim the
ability to assess the danger and to make choices for herself and her
children, no-drop policies may serve to further erode a victim's selfesteem and sense of control.' 70 In conjunction, no-drop policies could
deflect attention away from other less punitive and coercive means of
coaxing victims to participate in the criminal justice process.' 7 ' The
focus on victim reluctance and prosecutorial control may obscure
172
other shortcomings in the system's treatment of battered women.
courts.' 67

C. No-Drop Policies Reconsidered
The lessons learned from research studies and the experience of jurisdictions that have implemented no-drop policies provide valuable
insights into their risks and rewards.
The first insight, perhaps, is that more studies are needed to assess
the effectiveness of these policies. 73 Although most reports indicate
that jurisdictions with such policies have lowered their dismissal rates,
a detailed and rigorous national study has yet to be performed. In
addition, jurisdictions with no-drop policies have discovered that a
167. Wisconsin Equal Justice Task Force, supra note 84, at 186.
168. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 123.
169. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1517; Minnesota Supreme Court Task
Force on Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, at 885. In Anchorage, Alaska,
for example, the contempt power of the court was used against a victim when she was
jailed for refusing to testify against her batterer. Waits, supra note 17, at 323 n.317.
170. Developments, supra note 1, at 1541; see Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 158.
171. Cf Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 158 (finding that by allowing victims to
drop charges after the initial hearing and supporting them to follow through, prosecution could make victims' lives safer-but only if victims do not eventually choose to
drop).
172. Domestic violence cases, for instance, receive insufficient police investigatory
support. Lerman, supra note 22, at 29. Additionally, battered women are often given
little or inaccurate information about the their legal options, thus discouraging them
from continuing further. See Eaton & Hyman, supra note 88, at 427 (indicating that
victims were indirectly dissuaded from proceeding in criminal court due to unclear or
incorrect information given by criminal justice personnel, including prosecutors); Ford
& Regoli, supra note 15, at 140 (stating that victims often have unrealistic expectations about the legal process and prosecutors do not have the time to explain the
process to them).
173. See Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 128.
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tremendous amount of resources are needed to effectuate such
policies. 174

Prosecutors with experience in "victimless prosecution" have found
that their rates of conviction compare favorably with other types of
cases. 175 These prosecutors have found that, despite an initial de176
crease in conviction rates, successful outcomes increased over time.
Prosecutors achieve better results when they deal with victims in a
sensitive manner and use specific techniques for introducing evidence
when the victim is not present.'" By refusing to drop charges until
the initial hearing, as several jurisdictions have done, prosecutors benefit from increased plea agreements with batterers who plead guilty
once they realize the state's staunch position.1 78 As judges become
conditioned to trying cases without the victim and admitting certain
types of evidence under newly-argued exceptions to hearsay rules,
cases become much easier to prove. 17 9 The police also contribute significantly to rates of conviction by improving evidence-gathering." 0
Lastly, when victim advocates counsel victims and support them in
other facets
of their lives, victims often become more amenable to
8
testifying.' 1
Batterer retaliation represents another genuine concern. However,
studies suggest that prosecution does not increase the victim's risk of
being subjected to repeat violence.' In fact, prosecutorial action up
through an initial hearing in court has been found to significantly reduce the chance of further violence within the six months after the
case is disposed." 3
174. See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514 n.38 (discussing the need for a
resource intensive system where there is a no-drop policy).

175. Id. at 1508 (citing 88% conviction rate in San Diego City Attorney's Office);
Sandra G. Boodman, What Can Be Done?, Wash. Post, June 28, 1994, at Z1l (noting

87% conviction rate in Duluth, Minnesota).
176. During the first six months of a policy that aggressively prosecuted offenders

without victim assistance, the City Attorney's office won only twice in 17 trials. Today, although almost 60% of their cases involve uncooperative or absent victims, conviction rates are at 88%. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1508.

177. See iU. at 1516-17; cf. supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing

procedures used by San Francisco District Attorney's Office).

178. See supra note 56, 150, and accompanying text.
179. See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1507 (stating that although 911 tapes
were not allowed in the first few cases, judges eventually began admitting them and
"the true emotion of the crime started to be felt in the courtrooms in San Diego as
never before").

180. See id at 1513.
181. Id at 1515 (stating that prosecutors throughout the country are "finding much

greater success in obtaining convictions and in working with victims once they remove
the responsibility for the criminal case from the victim"); see Asmus et al., supra note
72, at 131.
182. David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, Preventive Impacts of Policiesfor Prosecuting Wife Batterers, in Domestic Violence: The Changing Criminal Justice Response, supra note 1, at 181, 193.
183. Id.
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Experience in jurisdictions that have adopted no-drop policies has
also shown that the need for conviction can be balanced with victim
autonomy. For example, prosecutors in San Diego and Duluth have
developed expertise in trying domestic violence cases, and routinely
win cases without the aid of victim testimony. 184 In addition, when
victims receive support from victim advocates and are relieved of the
responsibility to press complaints forward, more victims end up cooperating with the state. 85 In all, except for the most critical of cases,
where all other avenues of resolution have been exhausted and the
gravity of the harm justifies it, increased victim support and special
1 86
prosecutorial techniques obviate the need for punitive measures.
IV.

No-DROP POLICIES

AND

A

COORDINATED RESPONSE TO

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

This part argues that the benefits of no-drop policies outweigh their
risks and calls on states to adopt statutory measures to promote the

adoption of no-drop policies in a manner that effectuates existing legislative intent to treat domestic violence as a serious crime.
A. Rewards of No-Drop Policies
No-drop prosecution policies, as designed, serve to bridge the gap
between statutory commands and everyday enforcement. 187 As
designed, they aim to refine prosecutors' discretion in a manner that
favors vigorous prosecution 88 and counteract historical and organizational biases towards inaction. Under no-drop policies, prosecutors
are compelled to look at each case carefully instead of relying on assumptions about what victims will do next.189 As experience has
demonstrated, victims' reluctance to proceed may stem as much from
the treatment they receive from the criminal justice system as the
treatment they receive from their batterers. 190
184. See supra notes 47-48, 64-65, and accompanying text. The San Diego City
Attorney's office requested arrest warrants on eight cases between 1988 to 1993. The
office had two incidents where the victim was jailed overnight. Gwinn & O'Dell,
supra note 13, at 1518. The City Attorney's office believes that by vigorously pursuing cases even to the point of incarceration, it has maintained credibility with the

defense bar and has achieved convictions in over 2000 cases each year. Id.

185. See Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 13, at 1514-15; supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
186. Gwinn & O'Dell, supra note 14, at 1518; cf. Minnesota Supreme Court Task

Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts, supra note 7, at 887 (stating that where the
prosecutor tells the victim at the outset that she is not responsible for the decisionmaking and convinces the victim that the prosecutor will be her advocate, secondary
victimization may be avoided).

187. See Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts,
supra note 7, at 889; supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 19, 47, 64-65, and accompanying text.
190. See Lerman, supra note 22, at 10; supra discussion part II.A.
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In addition, by emphasizing prosecutorial control of decisionmak-

ing, no-drop policies communicate the message that domestic violence

is a crime against the public order, not just the victim.' 9' The use of

such policies acknowledges the exigencies and constraints faced by a
battered woman, and removes the onus on her to proceed."9
Although the application of no-drop policies has resulted in instances of revictimization by the courts, other jurisdictions have identified effective procedures for minimizing these risks. 193 Despite the
coercive nature of no-drop policies, victims may be empowered simply
by witnessing a place where the batterer's control does not extend.

94

Arguments that no-drop policies subvert individualized justice fail
to account for the fact that no-drop policies only presume continued
prosecution; they do not mandate it.' 95 No-drop policies help to refine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in a way that reflects increased social
commitment to intervening in cases of woman
96
battering.1

Arguments that these policies could lead to neglect of cases involving more serious crimes similarly disregard an important reality-the
substantial practice of undercharging cases of domestic violence.' 91
For example, one national study indicates that more than one-third of
misdemeanor domestic violence cases would have been charged as

felonies if perpetrated by a stranger.' 98 Of the remaining cases, fortytwo percent resulted in injury to the victim-a higher injury rate than
for felony rape, robbery, or aggravated assault combined. 99 In addi191. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
192. See discussion supra part II.B.
193. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text; see also Gwinn & O'Dell,
supra note 14, at 1517 (finding that through the use of their protocol, they have maintained an 88% conviction rate and, during the past 10 years, have only jailed two
victims despite trying 400-500 cases a month).
194. Cf. Angela West, ProsecutorialActivism" Confronting Heteroserism in a Lesbian Battering Case, 15 Harv. Women's LJ. 249,255 (1992) ("I believe that the victim
is empowered by seeing the defendant prosecuted.... Seeing the abuser in a position
of social disapproval may be the first step toward realizing that there is help available
195. See supra notes 19, 33, and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Florida Gender Bias Study, supra note 9, at 859; Bettina BoxaU &
Frederick M. Muir, Prosecutors Taking Harder Line Toward Spouse Abuse, LA.
Tmes, July 11, 1994, at 1A1 (stating that 90% of the county's spouse abuse cases are
filed as misdemeanors); see also Eaton & Hyman, 88, at 461-62 (reviewing advocates'
criticisms that prosecutors reduce or minimize charges in too many cases); Rene
Lynch, Spousal Abuse Is Rarely Prosecuted as a Felony in O.C., L.A. Times, June 26,
1994, at Al (finding that a significant amount of felony arrests are reduced to misdemeanor charges by prosecutors).
198. Buzawa & Buzawa, supra note 7, at 56.
199. 1d; see also Hart, supra note 84, at 626 (stating that law enforcement personnel "routinely classif[y] domestic assault as misdemeanors even though the criminal
conduct involved actually included bodily injury as serious or more serious than 90%
of all rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults").
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tion, experience has shown that where domestic violence is involved,
minor assaults often escalate in frequency and severity, sometimes
leading to murder.2° Thus, prosecutors who try domestic violence
cases pursue and may thwart201some of the most serious and potentially
lethal crimes in the system.
B. A ProposedState Response
In light of the benefits of no-drop policies, states should adopt
measures to promote their use. Statutory measures promoting nodrop policies should direct state, county, and city prosecutors to develop and implement written protocols that address procedures for:
(1) providing victim support; (2) handling withdrawal of victim cooperation; (3) using subpoenas for victims; and (4) gathering corroborating evidence exclusive of the victim's testimony.2" In contrast to a
statement of policy encouraging the use of no-drop policies, 20 3 measures requiring the development of a written protocol obligate prosecutors to coordinate with community service providers and law
enforcement. 2°
State measures should also provide for compliance oversight by a
task force or commission on domestic violence.20 5 In light of the fact
that the theoretical check on a prosecutor's exercise of discretion is
public scrutiny,20 6 this measure merely serves to institutionalize this
oversight by providing an avenue for community members to actively
participate.
States should further support the adoption of no-drop policies by
setting aside technical assistance grants for prosecutor's offices whose
plans meet certain defined requirements .20 Recipients may be de200. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1557 (finding that without early intervention, battering episodes frequently lead to more serious assaults and sometimes murder); Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 6, at 140 (discussing high frequency of assaults on

battered women as tracked through emergency room visits).
201. The undercharging of domestic abuse cases clearly presents yet another example of prosecutors who do not take these cases seriously. See Eaton & Hyman, supra

note 88, at 462. Although the problem calls out for further examination, it is also

beyond the reasonable scope of this Note. For a brief synopsis of the implications of
undercharging, see Ford & Regoli, supra note 15, at 160 n.2.
202. See discussion supra part I.B. (discussing legislation concerning no-drop
policies).
203. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
204. A coordinated community response to domestic violence serves as the current

model for effectively ending the cycle of violence. Developments, supra note 1, at
1550.

205. Cf. Cal. Penal Code § 14142 (Supp. 1994) (establishing county domestic violence task forces); Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 19 § 770-b (Supp. 1994) (establishing Maine
Commission on Domestic Abuse); N.Y. Exec. Law § 575 (McKinney's 1993) (estab-

lishing New York state office for the prevention of domestic violence).

206. Goldstein, supra note 92, at 10; LaFave & Israel, supra note 7, § 13.3(g).
207. Cf. Ca. Penal Code § 273.82 (West Supp. 1994) (setting aside funds for spousal
abuser prosecution units that use vertical prosecution measures); Wash. Rev. Code
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fined as those offices that have developed plans in conjunction with
community-based victim service providers, offices that participate in
community roundtables on domestic violence, or offices that provide
in-service training to police on reporting and gathering evidence.
Through the use of such grants, the state minimizes the possibility of
overburdening prosecutors' offices and provides an incentive for prosecutors to work cooperatively with community groups and other justice personnel.
V.

CONCLUSION

Battering " 'is a way of "doing power" in a relationship,' an effort
by the batterer to control the woman who is the recipient of the violence."2 ' By dismissing cases simply because a victim requests it,
prosecutors allow batterers to extend their power and control into the
courtroom. No-drop policies have been used in a number of jurisdictions throughout the country and have effected positive changes in the
attitudes of victims and justice personnel concerning the role of criminal prosecution in combatting domestic violence. Most importantly,
no-drop policies close the gap between the statutory promise of protection for battered women and the justice they receive.

Ann. § 70.123.40 (1992) (setting aside grants for use to develop protocols among
agencies).
208. Mahoney, supra note 1, at 53 (footnote omitted).

